Paradigm and Breakdown
The Current
Paradigm and Breakdown
The current paradigm for trusted computer syst,ems holds that trust is a property of a system. It is a. property that ca.n be formally modeled, specified, and verified.
It can be "designed int,o" a. system using a rigorous design methodology.
For high levels of a.ssurante, the design methodology uses forma.1 models sod methods in order to "prove" tha.t trust is present.
This paradigm underlies The Department of Defense Trusted Computer System E~valuation Criteria (TCSEC) [3] , commonly ca.lled the "Orange Book," and its companion "rainbow series" rep0rt.s. In this paper, we will refer to these documents a.s the "Crit.eria." The Criteria specifies a. met.hoclology for modeling, designing, and implement~iug a. syst,em tl1a.t builds trust into a system, and a process for proving t.o an evaluator that the methodology has been followed. For a description of the Criteria, and the eva.lua,tiou process, see Chokhani [l] . Application of the Criteria. 1la.s been fraught wit,11 problems for both developers and eva.lua.tors. Steve Lipner clearly a.rticulated this breakdown in t.he keynote address a,t IFIP-SEC 91 [4] . The problems he identified include: Systems a.re not opera.ted in their eva.luat.ed configuration.
Eva.luated systems are penetrat,ed because they are not properly configured or operated.
The Criteria apply to operating systems products, whereas actual opera.ting environments include heterogeneous networks and a.pplicat.ions.
Applica.tions must, run wit.11 "privilege," overriding the opera.ting systems controls. Evaluation becomes irrelevant.
There is no esperiential ba.sis on which to build applicat.ion-level crit.eria.
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Rea.1 systems are vast,ly more comples t.han t,heir security models. We slia.ll propose' r;iicl~ R paradigm here. aud we invit.r t hc reader to csplo~~~ its ilnplicalioils with me.
The need for a paradigm shift is not limited to the domain of security. Peter Denning [2] has noted that software quality is held as a property that ca.n be designed into a system by a four-stage process: formulate the requirements, develop formal specificat,ions for the requirements, develop programs from the specifications, and demonstrate tha.t the programs meet the specifications. He proposes a shift in paradigms by reframing the question "What is softwa,re quality?" to "How do we satisfy the customers of our software?"
The paradigm for trusted syst,ems presented here similarly focuses on producing systems that satisfy customers, in this case, systems tl1a.t customers trust in the domain of security.
2 What is Trust?
2.1
Trust is an Assessment
The word "trust" is used with people, organiza.-tions, a.nd objects. It is a.11 assessment. t.hat a person, organization, or object can be count,ed on to perform according to a given set of standards in some doma.in of action. As an assessment, it, is a declara.tion ma.de by an observer rather tl1a.n an inherent property of t.he person, organization, or object observed.
For example, we may t.rust a. person to spea.k trut,hfully, keep promises, a.rrive on time, give an eut.ert.a.ining talk at a conference, represent, our concerns at an important meeting, 1ea.d a prqject,, implement a program, fly an airplane, or perform open hea.rt surgery. We may trust an organiza.tion t.o keep our records confidential, deliver certain types of products or services, or refund our money if we are unsa.tisfied. We may trust an airplane to not cra.sh, a. bridge t,o not collapse, the groceries we purchase to not be conta.mina.ted or poisonous, or a progra.m to perform it#s st,a.t.ed funct.ion and not have undesira.ble side e0'ect.s.
An assessment of trust is always relat,ive to a doma.in of action. We may t,rust a. person t.0 give a stimulating lecture on computer crime, but not t,rust them to fly an airplane or cook a Tha.i dinner. M'e may trust a woodworker to produce a. cabinet of esceptional qua.lity, but not trust them to deliver it, on t.ime. Thus, people are not simply trusted or not. trusted, but rather trusted or not trusted in a. pa.rticular doma.in. However, we often lose the distinction of doma.in, generalizing assessments of trust a.cross doma.ins. For t.his reason, we often hear people say t,hings like "This person cannot be trusted."
Likewise, an assessment, of t,rust. is always made against a set of standa,rds in the domain of action.
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These standards evolve in communit,ies of people who interact and coorc1ina.t.e a.ction together, a.nd t.hey may differ from one cult.ure t,o t,he next.. They a.re oft,en loosely defined or subjective, for esa.mple, stlandards for a "good tea.cher," a "good rest.aurant.," or a. "good department." They may be so ingra.ined in our culture that we are not even consciously aware of t,lieir presence. Yet they play a crit.ical role in our coordinat,ed actions in the worlcl.
The domains and standards for t.rust, change over time as new technologies come to ma.rket, and new breakdowns occur. A few yea.rs ago, nobody wa.s concerned about whether a floppy disk might contain a. computer virus or other form of ma,licious code. Now people are reluct,ant, t.o t,rust a. disk if t.hey are not. sure of its origin. The Tylenol scare led t,o highcrr st.an(lartls for packa.ging drugs a11(-1 other goods.
An a.ssessment, of t.rust may or may not. bc grounded.
It. is grounded if evidence can be produced t,hat, the st,antlards are met. Ot,herwist: it. is ungrounded. In many sit,uat,ions, it. is less import.a.nt. whether a.n a.ssessment, is grounded t.han whet.her it. is believed. People act. out of t.heir beliefs even when there is no evidence t,o support, t,hem.
How Assessments of Trust are Made
We make assessment,s of t,rust. based 011 our csperieiices in t.he world. As we iiit.eract wit.11 ot.hcr people'. organiza.tions, and 0bject.s. we observe the t4ect.s and form our assessments. If a person consist.ent.ly keeps Uieir promises, t,hen we t,rust. that. person t.o keep fut,ure promises. But. if t.hey fail to keep a promise, we may begin t,o dist,rust, them. Similarly, if we t.ry a new restaura.nt and ha.ve a good experience, t,hen we may make an assessment, that. t.he rest,aurant, is excellent. However, if we go back a.nd have a ba.tl experience, we will change our assessment a.ntl possibly nc\w Yet.urn. We oft,en make assessment,s of t.rllst. basctl 011 a single incident,: t.his is why first. impressions arc' So impoltant..
If we do not. have dir& experience with a p~?rsoll, organization, or object,, we will make an assessment. of trust ba,sed on the declarat,ions of ot.hers whom we t.rust,. If a. person whom we t,rust. saps t,lia.t anot,her person is an ent.ert,a.ining and stimula.ting speaker, t.hen we may accept, t.heir assessment and invit,e t,lie person to give a. There has been a growing industry relating to the buying and selling of assessments of trust. This industry includes organizations such as Consumer Reports; consultants and consulting firms with expertise in specialized domains; and ma.gazines, newsletters, and articles which evaluate products, services, and organizations. Although we often rely on the assessments of others, we give greater weight to our own experiences, and we will not accept another person's assessment if it contradicts our own experience. Instead, we may lose trust in the other person's assessments. We a,re most influenced when we lack experience of our own.
We thus ground our a.ssessments of t,rust on our personal experiences a.nd on the experiences of ot,hers whom we trust. We seldom base our a.ssessmenf.s on mathematical theories. The Golden Gate Bridge is trusted, not because someone proved i~~a.t,liema~t.ica.lly that it would not collapse, but, rather because it. has withstood over 50 years of service. In 1987, it passed an impromptu "proof test" by supportiug t,lie la.rgest load ever, 250,000 people. By compa.rison, the Tocoma Narrows Bridge, which was built using t,he same theory, was destroyed by wind in 1940 [5, 6] .
This does not mean tha.t forma,lism ha.s no role in the establishment of trusted product,s. Forma.1 theories and methods ma.y be used to va1ida.t.e certain aspects of a product, e.g., to show that. a circuit design or software module will sa.tisfy cert,a.iu properties. These methods can help the developers establish trust in their product before it is relea.sed. However, t,he product itself will be a.ssessed by users according to their standards. If a softwa.re product shows no evidence of containing malicious code after several years of use, then it will be trusted t.o be non-malicious regardless of whether tl1a.t propert,y was forma~lly proved.
2.3
Trust is a Critical Element of Markets
Assessments of trust a.re thus formed and sha.red in a. world where we interact with the people, orga.nizations, and objects around us. This world is a.lso a marketplace of transa.ctions, and the va.lue of a person, organization, or object in the market will be determined to a large part by the a.mount, of t.rust t.1la.t others have in them. If a. person has a. reput,a.tion of being a highly talented athlete and of high integrity, then that person will ha,ve many opportunities in t,he market. Similarly, if a service provider 1la.s a reputation of providing exceptional service at competitive prices, then it is likely to do will. But, reput,ations are volatile. Once a person or organiza.t.ion acquires a. reputation of being unt,rust,wort,lly, it ca.n br hard t.o overcome that reputat.ion even if t,he assessmc~nt was poorly grounded.
The word "market" is being used in a very loose wa.y to refer to the space of all transactions, including social transactions that do not involve money. A tra.nsact.ion is any exchange between two part,ies. The transaction may involve loaning a. book in exchange for t.he right, to borrow one in the fut,ure or even for t,he friendship that will follow from the loan. A conversation ca.u be regarded as an excha.nge where two people sha.re information, beliefs, thought,s, and emotions.
In this ma.rket,, people can trade as they choose, subject only t.0 their own abi1it.y to make offc,rs t.hat. a.re desired by others, and by t.he regula.t.ions and rules tl1a.t are imposed by government,s and private organizations. The via.bi1it.y of a person, company, or product in the world is strongly determiued by the trust. they evoke in those t.hey wish t.o int.eract. and t,rade with. The market will event.llally weed out. people, orga.uiza.tions, a.nd prodoct.s I.llat are considered unt,rustworthy, t,hougli t,his ma? take t inie if t.liere is lit.-tle or no competition in t,liat. tlomaiil. III a sense. t,he market determiiies t.lie crit.Pria for 1 rust based 011 t,lie needs and demands of t,he people.
In the clomain of aircraft., for example, t.he market has dema.nded pla.nes t.ha.t do not, crash. If a. plane crashes and the cause of t,he crash cau be a.ttribut,ed t,o a design flaw, then people will not. fly on planes of tha.t t.ype. This happened t,o t.he IX'-10 after oue incident, and there are people who still avoid it. 3 The New Paradigm
The current para.digm of t,rea.tiug i rllst as a. propert,y is inconsist,ent, wit.1~ t.he way t.rust is act.ua.lly est.a.blished in t,he world. It. is not. a. property. but, rat.her an assessment tl1a.t is based on experience and sha.red through networks of people in t.he world-wide market.. It is a. declaration made by an obsc~vc~ rath(Ar t.han a property of t,he observed.
In t.he new pa.radigm. we see tllat a "t~rustetl szstern" is one t,ha.t produces assessnle1lt.s of trust.. l'hese assessn1ent.s are based on st.aiitlards of perforinaiice and are grounded in observable behavior of t.he l)roduct in the marketplace. The st,a.ndards for t,rust. will change as new technology, new t,hrea.bs. and uew practices a.re introduced in t,he ma.rket,. Moreover. t.he assessments about a. part.icular syst.em will be cont.inu-33 ally remade each time the system is used. Ultimately, a system is trusted if and only if its users trust it.
The new paradigm has several implications relating to the Criteria and to producing trusted systems. The following touches briefly on these implications. Further study is needed to develop a more complete understanding of the proposed paradigm shift.
Security Criteria
At first glance, it might appea.r that the current Criteria recognizes that trust is an assessment rather than a property since the security rating assigned to a system (C2, Bl, etc.) is an assessment. However, the Criteria are baaed on the assumption that trust is a property that can be built into a. system following specified design methodologies ra.ther than the premise that trust itself is an assessment ma,de by users based on how well the observed behavior of t.he system meets their own standards.
In the new paradigm, securit,y criteria. would articulate the (possibly unsta.ted) sta.ndards tl1a.t users employ when making assessment,s of t,rust,; t,ha,t is, they would formulake the concept of cust,omer satisfaction in the domain of securit,y. They would emphasize those features that customers are most concerned about, for example, protection a.ga.inst brea.k-ins and viruses, simple access controls, ease of use, aad product support.
Since users do not particula.rly care how a. system is structured internally or the met.hodologies used during development, the security crit,eria. would not specify how a system should be modeled, structured, designed, or developed as in t.he current Crit,eria.. For example, there would be IIO concept of securit,y kernel, trusted computing ba.se (TCB), or forma.1 security policy model. There would be no requirements on system architecture, design specifica.tion and verifica.tion, or configuration management.
The standards would be specific to different types of products and stated in terms of a.ctua.1 users, processes, and entities rather tha,n a.bstra.ct subjects and objects.
Thus, they would not require "int.erpretation" of an abstract security model and they would be rea.dily understa.nda.ble to users and developers a.like.
To illustrate, the standards for operating systems might include discretionaay a.ccess a.t t.he level of individual files and users, logging of all successful and failed login attempts, a.nd brea.k-in prevention. The standards for database systems might include discretionary access at the level of records, a.tt*ribut,es, and individual users, and logging of a.11 database a.ccesses at the relation level and all upda.tes a.t the record level.
The standards for virus protect,ion soft,ware mighty include the abiliby to detect a.ny virus in a. specified list and the ability to remove any detected virus. The standards for networks and communica.tion systems might include optiona. encryption using t,he Da.ta. Encryption Standard.
There may be a common set of standards a.pplica,-ble to all types of products, for example, standards for product service and support. Since many security problems arise from improper inst,alla.tion or operation, or from flaws that are discovered after the product has been released, product support is a significant factor in customer sa.tisfaction and assessments of trust.
The staadards might, be classified according t,o whether they are required for a. cert,a.in "level of security" or for cert.ain t.ypes of environments (banking, hospital systems, ek.). For exa.mple, being able t.o withstand penetra.tion a.ttacks from legitimate users might. be associa.ted wit,11 a higher level of t.rust. t.han preventing brea.k-ins. A product could be c~~a.lua.ted by checking off t.he standards t,liat. it. m&s. "Securit,y benchmarks" could be inclutlf~tl with some of the st.anda.rds. For example, cousider a. st.andard for brea.k-in prevention. This st,andard could be a.ssessed through a. "1~rea.k-in benchmark" that. could be run against a syst,em t,o see if it. succumbs to cert,ain attacks, for example those t1ia.t use password cracking programs or exploit p0tent.ia.l net,work prot,ocol vulnera.bilit,ies. One ca.n envisa.ge ot,her benchmarks, for exanlple, to a.ssess t.lie ability of a virus protect,iou pa.cka.ge t,o det.ect virusrs.
This approach of assessing observable behavior and of using benchmarks is not new. Indeed, it, has ark=11 nat.ura,lly in the ma.rket. in response to cust,onier needs. There have been ma.ny publishrtl art.icles t,hat, rate or compare securit.y packages in concrete t.erms, and vendors and resea.rchers ha.ve developed soft.ware tools that can test for the presence of wea.k pa.sswords, improper defa.ult,s and syst.em set,tings. and various ot,her vulnera.bilities. All of t.hese assessments and tools have been developed wit.11 t.he goal of mc,et ing t.he needs of cust.oniers, and are ent.irely consistW1. wit,11 the way trust works in t.he world. T~IIS. t.h(l paradigm described in this paper is aheady practiced iu the commercial world, and the esist.ing practices provide a useful st,arting point, for det.erminiug securit,y crit,eria.
Although the Cri(.eria is based on a. model of t,rust, t,lia.t is inconsist,ent wit.1~ t.he way trust. works, it. Offers much t,owa.rds t.he const,ruct,ion of new securit,y criteria. Many of the requirement,s re1a.t.e to fun&ion-a.lity needed by users. and while many are abst,ract,, they could be made concrete.
The requirements for penetration and covert channel testing identify areas where benchmarks could be created, a,lthough it is unclear that protecting against most, covert channels corresponds to any real-world market need. The security criteria would be driven by market forces. They would reflect the current standards for trust in the market, and they would change with market needs. They would be developed by or at least with users representing a variety of different cust,omer bases. Although there could be more than one set of standards, a national or international standard has the advantage of providing industry with a clear set of guidelines.
The standard(s) could be produced by the government through the current NIST/NSA effort or by other standa.rds groups, for example, ANSI, t,he IEEE, and ISO.
Although security criteria. a.rticula.te community standards for trust, a system that meets t,he criteria. is not necessarily trusted.
Ultima.tely, trust is a.lwa.ys determined by users whose needs may devia.te from the community standards. This underscores the importance of product support from a vendor.
Producing
Trusted Systems
In the new pa.radigm, vendors would be free to design and develop systems using a.ny a.rchitecture and methodology they choose. The security crit,eria. would not impose any particu1a.r structure or met,hodology on the customers. Security kernels, forn1a.l models and methods, and other development,a.l requirements in the current Criteria would be used only to the extent that vendors perceive tha.t t,he ret.urn on t.heir investment justifies the cost. The requirements in the current Criteria, coupled witch t.he costly evalua.tion process, have led ma,ny vendors to conclude tha.t it, is simply not worth the effort. t.0 develop syst,ems a.t those levels where formal met,hods a.re required.
Removing these requirements opens up the possibility of considerable innovation in the development of trustsed systems.
Researchers may be able to uncover structures and methodologies that produce trusted systems at considerably reduced cost. The current Criteria were developed with t,he objective of eliminating a.11 security risks, at least a.t the higher levels. By ada.pting a. pa.rticu1a.r a,rchit,ect,ure and following a specified design methodology based on formal specifications and proofs, securit,y risks would be avoided. This risk-avoidance stra.tegy 1la.s t,he disadvantage of inhibiting innovation and progress in system architecture and development. If followed t.o its extreme, it will guarantee that, "trusted syst,ems" are archaic and not cost-effective.
As illust,rated by Pet.-roski [G] , progress in engineering comes only when designers take risks. Ta.king risks is essent,ial in order t.o build systems that a.re more economical, functiona.1, or aestheticall:y pleasing t,ha.n t,heir predecessors. h4ore-over, we learn more from our failures than our successes, and progress depends on failures.
A st,ra.tegy of creating criteria that elimina.te securit.y risks is especially dangerous because we la.ck worked exa.mples, especially for applica.tions such a.t dat,aba.se syst,ems, transaction processing sysems, and het,erogenous networks. A better strategy is to encourage risk taking while disseminating knowledge about, fa.ilures t.hrough channels such as CERT and secr1rit.y publica.tions.
The current pa.ra,digm for t,rust,ecl systems holds that trust is a property of a. system. We have argued tha.t t.his pa,radigm. which underlies t.he Crit.eria. for trusted systems, is inconsist.rnt, with the wa>. trust. works in the world.
We then examined t.he concept. of t rnsl,. showing t,lia.t trust is a.n assessmenf, made I)y an observer about, a person, organiza.tion, or object obsc~vetl. These assessments are formed and shart=tl in a world-wide market where people int,era.ct with each ot.her. wit.h organiza.tions, and wit,h objects. Our own assessment,s a.re based on our personal experiences and on t.he assessments of others whom we t.rust,.
This understa.nding of trust a.s an assessment, formed in a market, leads t.o a radically tlill?rtnt approa.ch to the development, of secr1rit.y crikria.
In his pa.radigm, the crit,eria. would be a scl of st.antlartls tlirectly rela.ted to cust,omer sat.isfactioll.
Tlw st antlards would reflect current. marIM I.c'clilii."iliciils.
Ix? specific to diflerent types of product,s. a.nd be stat.ed in t.erms of a.ct,ual users, processes, and ent.it,ies ral.lier t.1ia.n abstra.ctions such a.s subjects a.nd object,s. They would continua.lly evolve t,o respond t.0 new technologies, new threa.ts, and new demands in t.lle market..
The criteria. would not, impose requirement,s on t,lie internal st.ruct.ure of a. syst.eni or on tlevelopment, methodologies.
The vendors would be frcr to choose their own mrt hods for protlilcing sWurf' syst,ems. Their systems will br cvaluat.c-'d according t.o ma.rket,-based crit.eria. for cust.omer sat isfact.ion. alld t,hey will be trust,ed as long as t.l~ey I~WI I ht, c3v01ving sta.nda.rds and needs of t,he cust.omers.
Further st,ucly is needed t,o det,erlninc whet her l.he proposed approach is sound for at I(xnst commercial 40 systems if not military ones. If it is, then additional work is needed to identify the current communitystandards in order to formulate new criteria.
Beyond that, the approach opens up the possibility of new security architectures and methodologies, and of news products that support the evaluation process, in particulx security benchmarks.
